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Abstract
A relatively small but growing literature in economics examines conﬂictive activ-
ities where agents allocate their resource endowments between wealth production
and appropriation. To date, their studies have employed a one period, static game
theoretic framework. We propose a methodology to extend this literature to a
dynamic setting, modeling continuous conﬂict over renewable natural resources
between two rival groups. Investigating the system’s steady states and dynamics,
we ﬁnd two results of general interest. First, Hirshleifer’s “paradox of power”
is self-correcting. Second, if productive activities cause damage to disputed re-
sources, the introduction of a small amount of conﬂictive activity enhances social
welfare.
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There is a relatively small but growing literature in economics, based on the seminal work of
Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 1991), that focuses on the allocation of endowed productive resources
between wealth production and appropriation. Models in this literature, including ours, share
three basic features. First, it is assumed that conﬂict is a rational activity. Second, a well-
deﬁned and enforced system of property rights over at least some resources does not exist.
Third, the actors are assumed to be myopic, acting to maximize their current wealth.1
A fourth feature shared by the literature that follows Hirshleifer, but not by our model,
is that these models are static. We oﬀer a general method that takes an initial step towards
extending Hirshleifer’s framework to a dynamic setup by accounting for the full interplay
across time over the disputed wealth and between conﬂict and productive activities.
Hirshleifer develops a one period game theoretic framework that augments the standard
economic theory of production and exchange by treating wealth appropriation as a basic
economic activity. Production is peaceful, whereas appropriation is conﬂictive. An under-
lying assumption of all the models that employ this framework is that at least the portion
of the wealth of rival actors (typically two) that is open to appropriation lacks well-deﬁned
or enforceable property rights. Thus, a situation of anarchy prevails. Each actor’s ultimate
share of the contested wealth depends on its allocation of resources to appropriation. The
contested wealth also depends on this allocation: the greater the amount of resources that
is allocated to conﬂict, the smaller the amount of resources that is available for production
of the contested wealth. Each group maximizes its current wealth by allocating its resources
among production and appropriation with this basic tension in mind.
Hirshleifer’s basic framework has been extended in various ways to include diﬀerentia-
tion between defensive and oﬀensive activities, trade, and the use of various functional forms.
However, each of these extensions employs a similar one period game theoretic framework.
Hirshleifer (1995) takes an initial step towards a dynamic approach through successive it-
erations of the one shot game, beginning with out-of-equilibrium resource allocations and
examining conditions that ensure convergence to equilibrium allocations. However, this ap-
proach is not fully dynamic: it does not specify equations of motion for any variables, time is
not a variable in the model, and the condition for dynamic stability is not derived based on
standard dynamic analysis. The condition stated, instead, simply ensures the existence of a
one-period-based internal solution. Several authors in this literature, including Hirshleifer,
1Works in this area include, among others, Hirshleifer (1995), Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim
(1995), Neary (1997), Anderton et al. (1999), and Reuveny and Maxwell (2001).
1are aware that this is a limitation of the approach and have called for a dynamic extension of
the basic framework (see e.g., Skaperdas, 1992; Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman and Kim, 1995).
The goal of this paper is to take an initial step in answering these calls.2
We develop a relatively simple method to extend Hirshleifer’s static framework to a
dynamic setting, acknowledging two important motivations for conﬂict. First, conﬂict spoils
are used not only for instant gratiﬁcation, but may also be invested to increase one’s own pool
of resources. This pool may then be used for future productive and conﬂictive activities.
Second, parties ﬁnd themselves in conﬂict because wealth is generated, at least partially,
from disputed resources.
Our approach distinguishes between two types of resources. We label as “captive” those
resources that cannot be appropriated by rival actors such as innate intellectual, physical, and
human capital. We label as “disputed” those resources that may be appropriated by rivals,
such as common pool natural resources or the human capital of employees (as opposed to
that of ﬁrm owners). Generally, the usage rate of resources impacts their availability in future
periods, which can generate tension when resources are disputed. Thus, we propose a model
of continuing conﬂict that distinguishes between these two types of resources and tracks
their interactions by modeling their growth and usage rates, both of which are impacted by
conﬂict.
Our method assumes that the actors are myopic. A complete economic model of conﬂict
in the presence of property rights might allow for optimal time-path decisions where the
actors take into account the consequences of their future actions. This approach has not yet
been taken in the Hirshleifer-based literature. We need to emphasize that our results only
a p p l yt om y o p i ca g e n t s :t h eb e h a v i o ro fn o n - m y o p i ca g e n t sm a yd i ﬀer from the one presented
here. We defer the development of a full dynamic model of conﬂi c tw i t hn o n - m y o p i ca c t o r s
to future research. Such a model would likely be much more complex mathematically than
our model.
2It is worth noting that the issue of conﬂict dynamics has been considered in prior literature, but not
based on Hirshleifer’s framework. Usher (1989) develops a model in which a society moves between anarchy
and despotism. However, he provides no speciﬁc solution for the transition between these two states. Brito
and Intriligator (1985) develop a two period game theoretic model that studies the circumstances under
which conﬂict over the rights to a ﬂow of a single good leads to the outbreak of war. This model is basically
static, however, as the two period game is played only once. Powell (1993) models the guns-versus-butter
problem for two states, using a repeated game. Alternating, each period, one state or the other decides on
military spending, and in the next period on whether to attack the other state. Our model diﬀers from his
in that we distinguish between stock and ﬂow variables, and our actors respond to each other’s resource
allocation decisions.
2Our basic approach can be applied to study the determinants and implications of conﬂict
in various political and/or economic settings. For example, consider two nations engaged
in war. The ultimate goal of the conﬂict is to gain control over each other’s productive
infrastructure. Each nation will devote a portion of its resource endowment to the conﬂict.
The remaining resources would be devoted to general wealth creation via production ac-
tivities. These resources could be combined — for example, via trade — with the productive
resources of third party nations to generate wealth. In the absence of total defeat, both the
victor and the loser nations are likely to invest remaining wealth to develop their economies,
which in turn generates resources available for future conﬂict. Since only portions of total
resource endowments are devoted to conﬂict activities, all the resources in the model need
to be tracked over time in order to determine the size of the wealth and the intensity of the
conﬂi c ta ts t a k ea ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e .
Similarly, consider two ﬁrms that compete over a pool of potential proﬁts by investing
in R&D and marketing. The victor ﬁrm in any period will be better positioned to capture
potential proﬁts in subsequent periods. It will have greater resources to devote to product
development, and it may enjoy a greater level of customer loyalty. However, highly skilled
managers and researchers can be thought of as a disputed resource because they could leave
one ﬁrm to join another for the right price. Firms combine their wealth with managerial and
research knowledge to generate future wealth.
Finally, in a domestic political setting consider two competing parties combining their
political talents and campaign contributions to attract potential voters and, therefore, po-
litical power. While party funds and political talent may be thought of as captive resources
(since the ideologies of individuals rarely change enough to cause them to switch parties),
the common pool of potential voters can be thought of as a disputed resource. In each of the
three examples, the property rights over the disputed resource are, respectively, disputed,
weak, and nonexistent.3
Section 2 sets out our general modeling approach under conditions of conﬂict and cooper-
ation (no conﬂict). The general set up allows us to illustrate the model’s static and dynamic
components and describe how they ﬁt together. We shall see that the model generates
complex dynamics that can only be analyzed via the use of speciﬁc functional forms.
3Our business example comes closest to a case where property rights over the disputed resource (man-
agerial and research talent) exist. For example, ﬁrms might employ no-compete clauses in the employment
contracts of their employees. However, these are of ﬁnite duration. Short of slavery, property rights over
human resources cannot be complete.
3Keeping in mind that our methodology is generalizable, we apply it to conﬂict and
cooperation between two groups over renewable resources in Section 3.4 Both the conﬂict and
cooperation models employ a predator-prey framework in that the human populations prey
on a natural resource stock that is essential for their procreation. In the conﬂict model, each
period the groups divide their population endowments between harvest and conﬂict activities,
ultimately resulting in a share of the combined harvest of the two groups. Periods are linked
in two ways. First, the harvest of each group depends not only on its labor allocation but
also on a common pool resource stock that changes over time depending on harvest activity
and its own natural growth rate. Second, each group’s population growth rate depends on its
ultimate share of the total harvest. These links give rise to a complex dynamic interaction
between conﬂict, harvest, population and natural resources. For comparative purposes, we
also present a cooperative model in which the two groups act as one, devoting all their
captive resources to harvesting. It is worth reiterating that although the two groups are
cooperating, their basic relationship with nature is still one of predator and prey.
In Section 4, we study the statics and dynamics of the conﬂict and cooperation models.
The conﬂict model has four corner steady states that exhibit either no population in one or
both groups, or no resource stock. We focus on a ﬁfth steady state of the model, in which
both rival groups and the resource stock coexist. The cooperation model exhibits two corner
steady states with no population, one with a stock of the common poll resource, and one
without it. As with the conﬂict model, we focus on a third, internal steady state.
In Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), we develop a related application, using diﬀerent speciﬁc
functional forms in order to study conﬂict over resources in primitive historical societies, and
apply this conﬂict to contemporary less developed societies. The current paper proposes a
methodology to extend the general economic literature on conﬂict to a dynamic setting, and
develops two propositions: one on the potentially positive welfare implications of conﬂict over
renewable resources compared with cooperation, and the second on Hirshleifer’s paradox of
power.
The ﬁrst proposition echoes Usher’s (1992) general observation that a little violence is
good in the long run. We ﬁnd this both at the internal steady states and in the model’s
dynamics. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that both per capita income and the level of per capita
resources are greater under conﬂict. We also ﬁnd that the system’s dynamics are less volatile
under conﬂict. The second proposition deals with Hirshleifer’s paradox of power. Similar to
4Several studies of conﬂict that employ Hirshleifer’s framework use this case to motivate their analyses
(e.g., Hirshleifer, 1995; Neary, 1997). For an extensive review of the literature, see Reuveny and Maxwell
(2001).
4Hirshleifer, we ﬁnd a paradox of power in the sense that the group with less captive resources
at the beginning of each period wins the same share of the disputed prize. However, our
dynamic analysis shows that over time the paradox of power under the conditions identiﬁed
by Hirshleifer is self-correcting and does not exist as a steady state phenomenon. In the
steady state of our dynamic model, each group has the same strength and possesses the
same level of captive resources. Conclusions and research extensions are discussed in Section
5.
2 The models
2.1 The conﬂict model
The model with conﬂict features two competing actors. Depending on the speciﬁc application
actors could be individuals, groups, ﬁrms, political parties, or any two contenders. We
begin our development of the model by examining its static aspects. Each period, each
actor undertakes productive activities that generate potential wealth that is disputed via
conﬂictive activities. To keep our focus on the methodology of linking the periods, we ignore
the potentially destructive eﬀects of conﬂict. This assumption also allows us to compare our
results to the existing literature, which uniformly ignores these destructive eﬀects.5
Each actor possesses a captive resource stock that embodies both human and physical
capital. The captive stock possessed by each actor i at time t is denoted by Rit.E a c hp e r i o d ,
each actor allocates its entire captive resource stock between productive and conﬂictive
or appropriative activities.6 We denote the portion of captive resources devoted to such
activities each period as Fit.7 We denote the remainder of the captive resource stock by Eit.
Thus,
Rit = Eit + Fit; i = {1,2}. (1)
The portion of the captive stock devoted to productive activity by each actor, Eit,i s
combined with a disputed pool of resources, St, in order to generate wealth for the actor,
Hit.T h u s ,
Hit = fi (St,E it); i = {1,2}, (2)
5In many areas, such as business and politics, conﬂict need not be destructive at all.
6We shall use the term conﬂict and appropriation interchangeably throughout the paper.
7While appropriation encompasses activities aimed both at capturing the rival actor’s wealth and at
defending its own wealth, it is common in the conﬂict literature to refer to these activities as ﬁghting.
5where fi denotes the wealth production function of actor i, with properties fS > 0,f SS ≤
0,f E > 0,f EE ≤ 0 and fSE > 0.8 In Section 3, St represents a stock of renewable natural
resources and Hit represent’s actor i0s harvest. In the context of ﬁrm competition, St could
represent a stock of managerial and research talent that ﬁrms draw on and combine with their
captive resources (e.g., buildings, machinery, production line workers) to produce proﬁts. In a
political context, St could represent the total number of potential voters who are transformed
into voters for party i (Hit) after viewing the party’s campaign commercials (Eit).
I nt h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r eo nc o n ﬂict, it is common to assume, as we do, that the total
w e a l t ht h ea c t o r sp r o d u c ei np e r i o dt
Ht = Hit + Hjt i,j = {1,2},i6= j (3)
is at stake. That is, the actors derive income from the total yield of their productive activities
(Ht) by ﬁghting over it. Actor i’s period t income, Yit,i sd e ﬁned as the portion, Pit, of total
wealth that actor i obtains from the conﬂict process:
Yit = PitHt i = {1,2}. (4)
It is natural to assume that, ceteris paribus, the portion of wealth won by actor i is increasing
in the level of captive resources it devotes towards conﬂict and is decreasing in the level of
c a p t i v er e s o u r c e si t sr i v a ld e v o t e st o w a r d sc o n ﬂict. That is,
Pit = pi(Fit,F jt) i,j = {1,2},i6= j (5)
where p
Fit > 0 and p
Fjt < 0.I nt h ec o n ﬂict literature Pit is referred to as actor i’s contest
success function. Returning to our political example, one could think of Yit as political power.
Such power usually depends on the relative support of the party’s policies as compared to
the policies of rival parties. Thus, one can think of Fit and Fjt as party resources spent on
developing robust policies. Developing such policies is costly in that it often involves detailed
research.
In each period, each actor allocates its captive resources between productive and con-
ﬂictive activities in order to maximize its period t income. Expression (6) states the two
optimizations, for actors i and j, respectively:9
max
Fit
pi(Fit,F jt)[fi (St,R it − Fit)+fj(St,R jt − Fjt)] i,j = {1,2},i6= j. (6)
8In the general case examined here, each actor has access to a diﬀerent production technology. For
simplicity, we drop the subscript i when using derivative notation. Capital subscripts denote ﬁrst and
second order derivatives.
9In (6), it is possible to assume a single production function Fij(St,F it,F jt) instead of adding fi and
fj. This will not change the gist of our model. The important point is to allow for each actor to ﬁnd (via
optimization) its own optimal allocation of resource endowment between productive and conﬂictive eﬀorts.
6The reader will observe that we are implicitly examining conﬂict situations in which each
actor fully discounts the future. That is, our players are assumed to be myopic. We examine
this type of behavior for two reasons. First, we are interested in comparing our results to
the existing static literature on conﬂict, which also assumes that the actors are myopic. In
order to focus on the impact of the dynamic setting that recycles income into future wealth,
we choose not to alter the standard within-period optimizing behavior. Second, to extend
the model to a fully dynamic optimization requires more than simply having agents solve
ad i ﬀerential game. It also may require the storage of at least some portion of income or
the diminished use of the disputed resource, both of which assume enforceable property
rights. While this may be possible in some settings, in many settings the enforcement of
well-deﬁned property rights is impossible. In fact, the lack of enforceable property rights
over a common resource may be at the root of many disputes. Without such enforcement,
dynamic optimization is not justiﬁed.
In solving (6) we assume that conﬂict resources are chosen simultaneously and that each
actor holds Nash conjectures with regard to the level of captive resources its rival will devote
to conﬂict activity.10 We also assume that the levels of disputed resources and each actor’s
captive resources are common knowledge. Under these assumptions, optimization by each
actor yields the following best response (BR) functions:
˜ Fit = BRi (St,R it,R jt,F jt) i,j = {1,2},i6= j. (7)
Equating the two best response functions in (7) to solve for the Nash equilibrium levels
of conﬂict, we see that
F
∗
it = Ni (St,R it,R jt) i,j = {1,2},i6= j. (8)
Expression (8) illustrates that the level of conﬂict each period depends on the stocks of the
disputed and captive resources (St and Ri and Rj , respectively). Combining (8) with (1),
we see the Nash equilibrium levels of each actor’s allocations of productive resources, Eit,
are also functions of St, Rit,a n dRjt only. As such, the evolutions of the allocations of eﬀort
to conﬂict and to productive activities depend on the underlying evolution of the disputed
and captive resource stocks.
We turn now to the dynamic portion of the model. The growth rate of the disputed
resource stock is assumed to be aﬀected by its underlying exogenous growth rate and the
productive activities of the two actors. Recalling that the period t Nash equilibrium levels
10Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 1991, 1995) examines several types of conﬂict behavior including simultaneous
and sequential Nash (or Stackelberg).
7of captive resources devoted to productive activities are functions only of the disputed and
captive resources, we write the growth rate of the disputed resource stock as
dSt
dt
= s(St) − Ht (St,R it,R jt) i,j = {1,2},i6= j, (9)
where the underlying growth rate s(St) is assumed to be nonnegative. In the example stud-
i e di nS e c t i o n3 ,S represents a stock of natural resources, and the harvesting activities of
each actor is damaging to the resource stock. If we think of S as the stock of potential
customers, Ht could represent the sum of each ﬁrm’s sales of a durable good. Similarly, po-
litical campaigns aimed at attracting elder voters might alienate younger persons, negatively
impacting the total number of persons who might consider voting in future elections.
We assume that the growth rates of captive resources are positive functions of each actor’s
current captive resources and income. That is,
dRit
dt
= ri (Rit,Y it).i = {1,2} (10)
where rRit > 0 and rYit > 0. We also assume that
dRit
dt |Yit=0 < 0, which implies that if actor
i’s income is zero each period, the actor’s captive resources will eventually decline to zero.
For example, successful ﬁrms can invest proﬁts for future battles while successful political
parties and candidates often ﬁnd it easier to raise funds. However, unsuccessful ﬁrms and
parties often fold. Using (4), (5) and (8) we may write each actor’s current income:
Yit = Yi(St,R it,R jt) i,j = {1,2},i6= j. (11)
Thus the evolution of the system is described by (9), (10), and (11). The tensions in the
model are now clear. From (10) future captive resources are rising in current income and
resources, but from (9) large amounts of current resources may harm the amount of disputed
resource available for wealth creation in future periods. These tensions will be investigated
in Sections 3 and 4 for speciﬁc functional forms.
2.2 The cooperation model
T h ec o o p e r a t i o nm o d e la s s u m e st h a tt h et w oa c t o r sw o r ka so n ec o h e s i v eu n i t .F o re x a m -
ple, we can imagine that the rival actors have merged, come to a self-enforcing agreement
regarding how to split total wealth or share power, one actor has left the area or market, or
that tacit or overt collusion has been achieved. As in the conﬂict model, the basic setup is
assumed to be such that the actors are myopic and there are no secure property rights.11
11All derivatives of the functions in the cooperative model carry the same signs as their counterparts in
the conﬂict model.
8We assume that each group’s captive resource is fully employed. That is, it is not possible
to leave these resources idle.12 To maximize income, all captive resources are devoted solely
to the productive activity. Total wealth is
Ht = f (St,R t), (12)
which also represents the uniﬁed actor’s total income, i.e.,
Yt = Ht(St,R t). (13)
The growth rate of the common resource is given by
dSt
dt
= s(St) − Ht (St,R t), (14)
and the captive resource growth rate is given by
dRt
dt
= r(Rt,Y t). (15)
The model’s dynamics are governed by equations (13)-(15) and exhibit the same type
of tension between the captive and (previously) disputed resource stocks as seen in the
conﬂi c tc a s e . G i v e nt h a tw eh a v eas i n g l eu n i ﬁed actor, we might imagine that the actor
has established property rights institutions that might allow dynamic optimization. We do
not consider this case because our focus is to examine the impact of conﬂict in the dynamic
setting. Thus, we wish to compare the steady state and dynamics exhibited in (9)-(11) with
those in (13)-(15).
3C o n ﬂict and cooperation over renewable resources
3.1 The conﬂict model
This section applies our framework to the case of conﬂict over a common pool of natural
renewable resources, which constitutes (using our terminology) the disputed resource stock
in the model. The two rival actors are conceptualized as two groups of people. Each group’s
captive resources (again, using our terminology) are fully embodied in its human capital
(population).
Each group combines its captive resource with the disputed natural resource by harvesting
the disputed resource stock for food. The harvested food is subject to appropriation by the
12This assumption is important, as discussed in Section 4.2 below.
9rival group.13 Thus, a group may raise its income (food consumption) either by harvesting
the disputed natural resource or by appropriating its rival’s harvest. We assume that fertility
is rising in food consumption, resulting in a linkage between current income and the future
stock of captive resources (human capital embodied in population).
The structure of the application follows the framework laid out in Section 2. To apply our
framework we need to specify functional forms for the contest success function (p(Fit,Fjt)),
the productive activity function (f(St,E it)), the disputed resource dynamics (dSt/dt dif-
ferential equation) and the captive resource dynamics (dRit/dt diﬀerential equation). To
simplify the notation, we now drop the time subscripts.
Beginning with the contest success functions, we follow Hirshleifer (1988, 1991) in deﬁning




i,j = {1,2} i 6= j (16)
where α1 and α2 denote the relative eﬃciency of conﬂict eﬀort of the two groups respectively.







,w h e r e
m is a so-called decisiveness parameter that measures the eﬀectiveness of ﬁghting resources.14
Hirshleifer (1995) sets α1 = α2 =1and examines the impact of changes in m.I n
that special model, the internal (static) equilibrium solution exists only when m<1. This
result arises from the structure of that particular model (where all the resource endowments
are open to appropriation). The condition m<1 is not crucial for the existence of the
internal solution when, as in our model, only a portion of resources is assumed to be open
to appropriation.15
As indicated by expression (16), we set m =1and assume α1 > 0 and α2 > 0.16 As
discussed later, this assumption allows us to focus attention on the eﬀect of the disputed and
13The assumption that the total harvest (H), and not the disputed resource stock (S),i so p e nt oa p p r o -
priation is one of modelling convenience. One could alternatively imagine that each group allocates eﬀort
to capturing and defending a portion of the disputed resource stock and is able to consume all the harvest
from that stock.
14As noted by Skaperdas (1996) and Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2000), many studies set m =1and α1 =
α2 =1 .
15For a similar result, see Hirshleifer (1989, 1991).
16While many Hirshleifer-type models are based on (16), some studies specify these equations as general
forms. For example, in Neary (1997) P1 =
f(F1)
f(F1)+f(F2),w h e r ef is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Since
we investigate the dynamics in numerical simulations, we employ a speciﬁcf o r mt ob ea b l et oc o m p a r et o
Hirshleifer’s 1991 and 1989 papers. In Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), we employ the methodology of this
paper in the investigation of the eﬀect of m in a dynamic setting.
10captive resource dynamics on one of Hirshleifer’s (1989, 1991) central results: the paradox
of power.17
The harvesting technology of each group is m o d e l e da si nB r a n d e ra n dT a y l o r( 1 9 9 8 ) .
Hi = βSEi i = {1,2} (17)
where β denotes harvesting eﬃciency.18
Substituting (16) into (5) and (17) into (2) and performing the optimization in (6) yields











α1 (E1 + E2)
α1F1 + α2F2
. (19)
Solving (18) and (19) for F1 and F2 and using (1), (3), (4) and (17) yields the Nash








i,j = {1,2} i 6= j. (20)
The dynamic paths of population (each group’s captive resource) are assumed to evolve
according to the following equation:
dRi
dt
= δiRi i = {1,2}, (21)
where the growth rate of population (δi) rises with per capita income. Speciﬁcally, δi = ε+
ϕ
i,w h e r eε denotes the natural net birth rate (i.e., the diﬀerence between natural birth and
mortality rates), which is assume to be negative, and ϕ
i = φ
Yi
Ri captures the notion of positive
dependence of fertility on the per capita income (φ>0).19 An alternative interpretation
17In Hirshleifer’s static setting, the paradox of power result holds for m =1 , but disappears when m gets
larger. We will show that in our dynamic setting the paradox of power result does not hold when m =1
(under similar conditions to Hirshleifer’s setting).
18This technology was proposed by Schaefer (1957), and is popular in the resource literature (e.g., Clark,
1990: Chapter 1; Brander and Taylor, 1998). Expressions (17) assume that each group’s harvest does not
depend on the harvest of the rival group. While this assumption is likely to hold when the resource is
in abundance, when the resource is scarce each group’s harvest may impose a negative externality on its
rival’s harvest, thereby reducing each group’s marginal return to harvesting. While our assumption has been
made for analytical tractability, the reader may note that the marginal return to harvesting, βS, falls as the
resource declines.
19Heerink (1994) ﬁnds support for this assumption in lesser developed countries. This assumption may not
describe higher income countries where fertility seems to decline with consumption. However, this criticism
applies less in our case. Clearly our application is amenable to rivalries in underdeveloped, primitive societies.
Note also that one could assume that ε and φ diﬀer across groups. As this would complicate the analysis
without adding much insight, and there is no a priori reason to assume that the groups diﬀer in these respects,
we do not consider such diﬀerences.
11of the dependency of fertility on resource consumption may be that natural resources are
essential for procreation. For instance, when food or water decline, fertility will decline. Since
we adopt the convention that ε is negative, population will decline to zero for suﬃciently
low rates of fertility. Incorporating the fertility assumption into (21) we obtain the following
two population diﬀerential equations:
dRi
dt
= Ri(ε + φ
Yi
Ri
) i = {1,2}. (22)
As is standard, we assume that the natural growth of the resource s(St) is given by the
logistic growth (the term inside the square brackets in (23) below). Combining the logistic












− βSE1 − βSE2 (23)
where r is the intrinsic rate of growth of the resource and K is the resource carrying capac-


















Substituting (20) into (22), the system of three diﬀerential equations in (22) and (24)
describes the dynamic evolution of S, R1,a n dR2.
3.2 The cooperation model
Absent conﬂict, we assume that all captive resources are devoted towards production so as
to maximize current period income (Subsection 2.2). Using the same functional forms as we
used to derive the conﬂict scenario, straightforward calculations show that the cooperative
system’s dynamics are described by
dR
dt













where R denotes total population. In the following section we will compare and contrast
both the statics and dynamics of the conﬂict and cooperative systems.
20For details on logistic growth see Clark (1990: 10). The logistic function implies that the natural growth
rate of the resource stock will be greatest when the stock is low. As the stock rises to its carrying capacity,
growth will slow, eventually to zero (at St = K).
124 The impact of continuing conﬂict
We ﬁrst examine the system’s steady states, and then investigate its dynamic behavior.
4.1 Steady states and comparative statics
The steady state solutions to the conﬂict system are found by setting the time derivatives







































This system of equations (27)—(29) has ﬁve solutions. The ﬁrst steady state, in which
R1 =0 ,R 2 =0 , and S =0 , depicts a situation in which both populations have declined to
zero following exhaustion of the natural resource. In the second steady state, R1 =0 ,R 2 =0 ,
and S = K, which describes a situation in which both populations have declined to zero
before the resource has been depleted, and the resource recovers to its carrying capacity. The
next two steady states are “semi-corner” solutions. In one steady state R1 =0 ,R 2 = R∗
2,
and S = S∗, and in the other R1 = R∗
1,R 2 =0 , and S = S∗,w h e r e∗ indicates some positive
level. The ﬁfth steady state is denoted as an “internal” solution since it depicts a situation



































































Using (30) and (31) one can discern the model’s comparative statics through diﬀerenti-
ation. Before turning to an examination of these comparative statics however, it is worth
noting that for suﬃciently small K, β,o rφ, an internal solution will fail to exist and our
corner solution with no population will prevail. This simulates the breakdown of anarchy in
13our model. Naturally, if we assumed diﬀerences in fertility and harvesting between the two
groups, anarchy may breakdown as one of the two groups becomes extinct.21
Since our intention is to examine continuing conﬂict, we focus on the impacts of the
model’s parameters on the level of conﬂict resources. Diﬀerentiation reveals that the steady
state levels of conﬂict resources are rising in r, K, and φ.T h e e ﬀect of each of these
parameters on F1 and F2 works through its eﬀect on each group’s population (see (31)).
Increases in r and K raise the growth rate of the natural resource. This in turn raises the
steady state population. An increase in φ raises population growth and the rate of harvest.
At the new steady state, population is greater while the natural resource is lower.22











(−4ε − Kβφ) i,j = {1,2};i 6= j. (32)
Recalling the ﬁnal equation in (30), the sign of (32) is positive if in steady state S>K / 2,
a n dn e g a t i v ei fi ns t e a d ys t a t eS<K / 2. That is, if the steady state S is relatively high
(low), raising harvesting eﬃciency raises (lowers) conﬂict. The steady state S rises with net
mortality rate and falls with harvesting eﬃciency and fertility. Hence, when the mortality
rate is high and harvesting eﬃciency and fertility are low, a rise in harvesting eﬃciency is
more likely to raise conﬂict in the steady state.
From (31) we see that when group 2 gets better at conﬂict (α2 rises), group 1 allocates


















¢2 > 0. (33)
This is so because as group 2 gets better at conﬂict (α2 rises), its marginal return to harvest-
ing has risen relative to that of conﬂict (as it retains more of its harvest). It then allocates
more eﬀort to harvesting. This results in ∂E2
∂α2 > 0 and ∂F2
∂α2 < 0. The improved conﬂict
eﬃciency of group 2 lowers the marginal return to group 1 from harvesting (as it retains less
of its harvest). This results in ∂E1
∂α2 < 0 and ∂F1
∂α2 > 0. The strength of these eﬀects grows with
K, r and φ,a n df a l l sw i t hε.
21Note that since ﬁghting resources are smaller than total resources it is possible that ﬁghting may stop
(anarchy may breakdown) prior to the extinction of a group, if we imposed exogenous conditions that dictate
the level of ﬁghting resources must be an integer (i.e., at least one person must be ﬁghting). For more on
the breakdown of anarchy and its implications, see Hirshleifer (1995) and Reuveny and Maxwell (2001).
22The eﬀect of an increase in the mortality rate (ε) is opposite that of φ.
14Using (20) and the ﬁrst equation in (30), we see that an increase in α1 raises group 1’s
population and income, and an increase in α2 reduces group 1’s population and income.
Hence, a group that becomes better at conﬂict is able to sustain a higher income and popu-
lation. But when its rival gets better at conﬂict, the group’s population and income decline.
4.2 Comparing conﬂict and cooperation
To this point, we have examined the impact of the model’s parameters on the conﬂict decision,
and the impact of that decision on the internal steady state. We now examine the impact of
the introduction of conﬂict on the steady state. To do so we ﬁr s te x a m i n et h ec o o p e r a t i v e
model’s steady states. In this case the system exhibits two corner steady states and one
interior steady state. The two corner solutions exhibit no population; one features the
natural resource stock at its carrying capacity, while the other has a resource stock at zero.23
We state the interior steady state since we wish to compare it to its conﬂict counterpart.













where the subscript nc, denotes no-conﬂict.
Comparing the ﬁnal equations in (30) and (34), we see that conﬂict raises the steady
state stock of resources, ceteris paribus. This result arises from the fact that conﬂict diverts
resources away from resource-damaging harvesting activities. The reader is cautioned that
we are able to obtain this result due to our assumption that conﬂict activity does not directly
damage the resource. The types of conﬂict activities we are considering, therefore, include
stealing and deterrence activities such as patrolling or building fortiﬁcations. However, it is
interesting to note that even in cases where conﬂict directly damages the stock of natural
resources, it might be easy to overestimate the improvement in the level of resources arising
from a suspension of conﬂict activities since such a suspension would likely cause an increase
in productive activities that could damage the natural resource stock.
Turning to population, we let R1nc = Rnc/2 and assume that in the conﬂict scenario both
groups are equally eﬃcient at ﬁghting, i.e., α1 = α2 = α, which we normalize to one. In this










23Each steady state solution is derived using the same methodology as that used in the conﬂict model.













Subtracting (36) from (35) we obtain









Equation (37) implies that conﬂict may raise or lower the steady state population.24
T u r n i n gt ot h ei m p a c to fc o n ﬂict on per capita income, under our assumptions regarding
equal conﬂict eﬃciency and symmetric group size, straightforward calculation reveals
Y
pc
1 = βS and Y
pc
1nc = βSnc, (38)
where the superscript pc denotes a per capita value. Comparing the ﬁnal equations in (30)
and (34), we see from (38) that conﬂict raises the level of income per capita.
Summarizing, conﬂict activity that does not directly damage the underlying natural
resource or human resources works to raise the steady state levels of the natural resource
and per capita income. Further, from (37) we see that for ε suﬃciently close to zero, or
for suﬃciently large K, β,o rφ, population may rise with conﬂict. Thus, it is possible for
conﬂi c tt oc r e a t eaP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t . 25 We record these observations in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 A little conﬂict is good. Conﬂict that does not directly damage the natural
resource stock nor directly harm the population stock raises the steady state resource stock
and per capita income and may also raise the steady state population stock.
The result contained in proposition 1 depends on three important assumptions. First,
in the cooperative model, all of the population is employed in harvesting; there is no free
disposal condition in the model (i.e., it is impossible to leave proportion of the population
idle). Second, the two groups behave myopically in both the conﬂict and cooperative models.
Third, as noted, conﬂict essentially has no destructive eﬀects on the natural resource and
human population stocks.
24The expression 1+3 ε/Kβφ can be written as 1+2 ε/Kβφ + ε/Kβφ. Since we are comparing internal
steady states, we know from our solution to the conﬂict steady state that 1+2 ε/Kβφ > 0. However,
ε/Kβφ < 0.
25F o ras i m i l a rr e s u l ti nad i ﬀerent context, see Usher (1992).
16If in the cooperative model, the two groups can restrain their productive activities by
leaving some part of the population idle (and without engaging in conﬂict), it may be possible
to obtain higher per-capita incomes in the steady state. However, we do not allow for the free
disposal of population, which may in fact be desired so as to limit the detrimental eﬀects of
harvesting. This assumption is reasonable in the current application. The captive resource
of each group is labor. If one assumes that each unit of labor is embodied in a diﬀerent
individual, there will likely be great incentive to defect from any plan under which some
labor resources remain idle, as long as agreements cannot be enforced in the absence of a
well-developed system of property rights.
The desire to control one’s harvesting activities also requires foresightedness, since some
of the beneﬁts from not harvesting today arrive in the future. Proposition 1 is derived under
the assumption that the two groups are myopic, both under conﬂict and under cooperation.
If the two groups were non-myopic, it is more likely that a setting of cooperation, where
harvesting is chosen in order to maximize the sum of discounted future utilities, would lead
to higher welfare than conﬂict. In the cooperative model, the two groups are likely to be
more successful in constraining their harvesting activities (although this is not guaranteed,
as stated previously); in the conﬂict model achieving such constraint is less likely. The
beneﬁt from constrained harvesting is the protection of the common pool resource for future
use. In the conﬂict model, each group is not likely to realize the full beneﬁts of constraining
harvesting because the beneﬁts must be shared with the competing group. Fully non-myopic
behavior will also likely involve consumption smoothing, which may require harvest storage
(if physically possible). This is more likely in a cooperative setting than in a conﬂict setting,
where any stored goods could be open to appropriation.
In the current application the assumption of myopic behavior is reasonable. Recall that
investment in the current example takes place via human fertility. Consequently, each time
period can be viewed as a generation, or at least a large number of years. As the simulations
below illustrate (under reasonable parameterization), convergence to the steady state is not
rapid. It is reasonable to assume that it is diﬃcult for any current generation to see the full
impact of its activities on the steady state outcome.
F i n a l l y ,o u rw e l f a r er e s u l ti sd e p e n d e n to nt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tc o n ﬂi c td o e sn o td a m a g e
the disputed or captive resources. It is not uncommon to have seen such conﬂict in primitive
societies. In some cases competing tribes settled disputes through ritualistic contests which
involved little bloodshed.26 It is also worth noting that the proposition would hold if conﬂict
26For an elaborated discussion of conﬂict in primitive societies, see Reuveny and Maxwell (2001). Maxwell
17caused a small level of damage to both types of resources. This seems likely in primitive
societies where weapons were much less destructive than they are today, although exceptions
certainly exist. Clearly, if conﬂict caused a high level of damage to either the disputed or
the captive resources, the cooperative setting would be more attractive. If conﬂict would
have damaged the disputed resource, the steady state harvest and per capita income would
likely be lower. If conﬂict would have damaged the captive resources, measured steady state
income might rise, but losses to captive resources should also be included in the welfare
measure, making conﬂict less desirable.
4.3 System dynamics
To the best of our knowledge, the system of non-linear diﬀerential equations (22) and (24)
does not have an analytical solution. Two methods may be used in such cases to learn about
the dynamics: local stability analysis and numerical simulations. A local stability analysis
involves linearizing the system around each steady state and ﬁnding its eigenvalues. This
method is not tractable analytically in our conﬂict case since the system’s characteristic
equation is cubic.27 Consequently, we investigate the dynamics via numerical simulations.
In order to simulate the system, we must settle on a particular parameterization. There
are, of course, many sets of parameters from which one could choose. It is also clear that
any such set is arbitrary to some extent, and the simulated trajectory may only apply to
that set. We base our choice of parameters on the studies of Hirshleifer (1989) and Brander
and Taylor (1998). We refer the reader to these two studies for a fuller discussion. Here we
brieﬂy describe the parameters.
The conﬂict eﬃciency parameters are taken from Hirshleifer (1989). In the base case α1
and α2 are set to 1. In a second case, α1 =1 .25 and α2 =0 .75. Brander and Taylor choose
parameters that roughly mimic historical estimated information about Easter Island. The
carrying capacity, K, is set to 12,000. The resource growth rate, r, is set to 0.04; the natural
mortality rate of the population, ε, is set to -0.1. The fertility parameter, φ, is set to 4, and
the harvesting eﬃciency parameter, β, is set to 0.00001. The initial populations are set to
40 each, and the initial resource stock is set at 12,000.
Figure 1 presents the base case for group 1’s population (R1), people allocated to conﬂict
and Reuveny (2000) develop a model in which conﬂict damages the disputed and captive resources. Their
model, however, is not based on Hirshleifer’s approach and does not employ game theory.
27Note that since the system is of an order higher than two, the phase diagram approach is not appropriate
here.
18(F1), the resource stock (S),a n di n c o m e(Y1).28 As shown, the system cycles dampen over
time.29 Income is a leading indicator of population and conﬂict, while changes in the resource
stock lead income changes. This is so because income aﬀects fertility, and a rise in S raises
harvest, income and fertility. We also ﬁnd that conﬂict resources (F1and F2)a r eh i g hw h e nS
is low. This observation deserves further comment since some studies link resource scarcities
to conﬂict.30 While our model generates outcomes that accord with the notion that resource
scarcity induces conﬂict (i.e., measured conﬂict is relatively high when per capita resources
are relatively low), we do not assume that conﬂict is driven by resource scarcity. Thus, one
must be cautious in drawing causal links between resource scarcity and conﬂict solely from
the observation that conﬂict is high when the natural resources stock is low.
[Insert Figure 1 here: Base Case]
Figure 2 presents a simulation of the system without conﬂict. In this case, we divided
the population level by 2 in order to make the ﬁgure comparable to Figure 1. We see
that the cooperative system exhibits more volatility, conﬂict having the eﬀect of reducing
the volatility of both population and the resource stock. This occurs because at its core our
application can be characterized as a predator-prey model in which humans are the predator,
and the natural resource stock is the prey. As noted, conﬂict activity diverts resources from
productive (predatory) activities. As a result, the impact of population growth on the
resource stock is diminished, and the system is less volatile. Figure 2 also demonstrates that
the cooperative model exhibits higher peaks of per capita resource scarcity, and therefore
poverty, over time. Thus, a little conﬂict is also good in dynamic sense.
[Insert Figure 2 here: No conﬂict]
4.4 The paradox of power in a dynamic setting
One of the central results derived by Hirshleifer’s static framework focuses on the eﬀect of dis-
parity in the actors’ initial eﬀort endowments on the actors’ wealth. Hirshleifer distinguishes
between two forms of what he calls the paradox of power. In the strong form,ad i s p a r i t yi n
initial eﬀort endowments, or (using Hirshleifer’s terminology) power endowments, between
28In this case the two groups are similar in every respect. The values for group 2 are therefore identical.
In addition, we plot income at ten times its actual level to be able to view it on the same graph with the
other variables.
29Figure 1 presents only the ﬁrst few cycles of the system’s evolution over time in order to illustrate clearly
the interplay among the system’s variables. Simulating the system beyond the 280 periods presented, we
ﬁnd that the amplitude of the cycles continues to decline over time. The system converges to a steady state
after approximately 500 periods.
30See, e.g., Homer-Dixon (1999).
19t w og r o u p sd o e sn o ti m p l yad i ﬀerence in their income in the model’s solution.31 As he
notes, “the contending parties will end up with exactly identical incomes (I1/I2 =1 )[ I
denotes income] regardless of the initial resource allocation” (Hirshleifer, 1991: 186). In the
weak form of the paradox, “the ﬁnal distribution of income will have less dispersion than
the initial distribution of resources” (Hirshleifer, 1991: 187), but the incomes are not equal.
Hirshleifer (1989, 1991) shows that for the case with m =1in the contest success function,
the strong form of the paradox holds as long as the initial power endowment ratio is not too
small, so that the solution of the static game is interior. When the initial power endowment
asymmetry is too large (i.e., one actor is too weak relative to the other), the model has no
internal solution, and then the weak form of the paradox holds.
Hirshleifer’s paradox of power result arises because the party with a lower power endow-
ment devotes relatively more of it to conﬂict, while the party with a higher power endowment
devotes relatively less of it to conﬂict. In the case where the power endowment are inter-
preted as population, the smaller group realizes the same income as the larger group (in the
strong form of the paradox), resulting in a larger income per capita for the small group than
for the larger group.
Hirshleifer also shows that as m grows from unity, the strong form of the paradox fails,
and as m grows further (in Hirshleifer’s numerical simulations this happens for m>4), both
the strong and the weak forms of the paradox of power fail. In this case, the model does not
have an internal solution when the initial resource endowments are not equal.
We focus on the case of m =1in order to investigate whether the strong version of
the paradox of power (which holds in Hirshleifer’s static framework) holds in our dynamic
version of Hirshleifer’s framework. In our model, the initial eﬀort endowments are equivalent
to human resource endowments. The gains from conﬂict are “invested” (via fertility) to
raise the eﬀort stock (or stock of power). The ultimate impact of this investment is seen
by examining our steady state levels of human resources and income. For the case with
m = α1 = α2 =1 , we see from (30) that









and from (20) that






31In the conﬂict literature it is common to equate the power of each group with its level of resources.
20Thus, in contrast to Hirshleifer’s one period (static) result, where R1 >R 2 while Y1 = Y2,
we see that in our dynamic setup the prerequisite for the strong version of the paradox of
power (R1 >R 2)i sendogenously eliminated. This steady state result holds for all initial
conditions, as long as the internal solution of the model exists, which requires that the
condition 2ε
Kβφ < 1 holds.32
To illustrate this point numerically, we plot the relative allocations of eﬀort to conﬂict
(F1
R1 and F2
R2) and the per capita incomes ( Y1
R1 and Y2
R2) in Figure 3. The initial population of
group 1 is set to 100 and the initial population of group 2 is set to 40 (as in the base case).
[Insert Figure 3 here: paradox of power with equal conﬂict eﬃciencies]
Figure 3 illustrates that initially group 2 (the group which has less captive resources in
period 0), as dictated by the paradox of power, devotes relatively more of its captive resources
to conﬂict than does group 1. As a result the level of disputed resources won by group 2
are greater relative to its captive resources than the relative level of disputed resources won
by group 1. Since in this application the level of captive resources of each group is identical
to the group’s population, we can say that the per capita income of group 2 is greater than
the per capita income of group 1 (Y2/R2 >Y 1/R1) This same phenomenon also happens in
Hirshleifer’s (1989, 1991) static game. The group with fewer people ends up with the same
income as the group with the larger number of people, which is the essence of the strong
version of the paradox of power. It follows that the income per capita of the smaller group
is larger than the income per capita of the larger group.
In our model the interaction does not stop after one cycle. Moreover, there is feedback
from income to the groups’ captive resources and, therefore, the disputed resources (via the
ﬁghting and the productive allocation channels). As a result of group 2 having a larger
income per capita than group 1, the population of group 2 grows faster than that of group
1, via fertility (see equation (22)). As time passes, as shown in Figure 3, the extent to which
group 2 allocates relatively more eﬀort (F2/R2) to conﬂict diminishes, while that of group
1 (F1/R1) rises. Eventually, the relative eﬀort allocations equalize across groups. At this
point, the populations of the two groups are also equal, determined by the resource and the
population parameters of the model. In this example, the initial population level of each
32The reader may note that the disappearance of the paradox of power over time does not happen in
Hirshleifer’s (1988, 1989, 1991) static framework if one reiterates the game because the eﬀort endowment
of each group (its power, e.g., its population) is constant. As noted, time is not a variable in Hirshleifer’s
work. In our model, population (the group’s power) is changing over time according to its law of motion (its
diﬀerential equation). The endogeneity of the captive resource (population) drives the disappearance of the
paradox of power, an eﬀect that is not present in Hirshleifer’s work.
21group is the initial power of each group. Hence, we see that the group with the lower power
endowment (or population) has caught up with the group with the higher power endowment
(or population).33 This analysis yields the following result.
Proposition 2 When contested resources are invested for future conﬂict and productive
activities, Hirshleifer’s strong version of paradox of power is self-correcting, and consequently
the preconditions for the paradox of power do not exist in the steady state, ceteris paribus.
The disappearance of the paradox of power preconditions in steady state for the case
m =1is driven by two factors. The ﬁrst is the paradox itself. Namely, the resource-poor
group generates a greater return on its conﬂict allocation (i.e., a greater per capita income).
The second factor is that the returns to investment in eﬀort (i.e., population growth) are
rising in terms of per capita income (i.e., fertility rises with per capita income). The latter
factor is plausible for our setting of conﬂict between relatively underdeveloped groups over
natural resources.34
The endogenous disappearance of the paradox of power preconditions is signiﬁcant be-
cause it suggests that persistent disparities of resource endowments among groups in conﬂict
must be driven by exogenous factors. These factors could include, for example, laws written
by the dominant group that restrict access to investment opportunities (such as education
opportunities) for resource poor groups.35
F i n a l l y ,w ei n v e s t i g a t et h ei m p a c to fd i ﬀerential conﬂict eﬃciencies through the simulation
illustrated in Figure 4. In this simulation, group 1 is more eﬃcient at conﬂict than group
2( α1 =1 .25 and α2 =0 .75) and holds an initial advantage in terms of greater resources.
Interestingly Figure 4 illustrates that per capita incomes are equalized while we know from
33It is worth noting that this result is dependent on the assumption that fertility rises with income per
capita. Other ”investment” functions may not generate this result (e.g., when investment returns rise with
total income).
34If the growth rate of the captive resource does not rise with the level of investment per unit of captive
resource, which may be the case with physical capital, the paradox of power may not disapear. However, we
can think about non population-related cases for which this assumption may be reasonable. For example,
once proper economic and political institutions are in place, some lesser developed countries (LDCs) tend
to generate greater returns on investments than developed countries (DCs). Their economies subsequently
grow faster, so that the per capita capital disparity between DCs and LDCs declines.
35The reader may note that the disappearance of the paradox of power is not an artifact due to equation
(22). This equation implies that in steady state (dRi
dt =0 )income per capita of both players ( Yi
Ri) is given
by − ε
φ. In our model, however, two groups that begin with diﬀerent populations (R1 6= R2), e n du pi n
steady state with the same income (Y1 = Y2) and the same population (R1 = R2). The result that Y1 = Y2
and R1 = R2 implies that Hirshleifer’s (1989, 1991) paradox of power can not exist in the steady state of
our model. Our result is driven by the populations changing endogenously (i.e., investment), whereas in
Hirshleifer’s model they are constant.
22(30) that R1 >R 2 in the steady state. Have we recovered a steady state paradox of power?
No. Observe from (20) that the conﬂict eﬃcient group (group 1) always earns more income
than its less eﬃcient rival. As a result it is able to sustain a higher group population in the
steady state, leading to an equalization of per capita incomes in the steady state, but not of
total incomes.
[Insert Figure 4 here: Paradox of Power with Diﬀerential Conﬂict Eﬃciencies]
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper extends the literature in economics that examines agent decisions to allocate
resources between productive and appropriative (or conﬂictive) activities in a static setting.
We suggest a method that allows for the study of such conﬂict in a dynamic setting. Rather
than simply repeating the same static game, we link periods of conﬂict by allowing the
competing groups to invest the spoils for future conﬂictive and productive activities, and we
model the dynamic paths of both captive and disputed resources.
Our principal goal in writing this paper was to illustrate a methodology for modeling
continuing conﬂict in a fully dynamic setting. Illustrating our method in a speciﬁc case, we
obtain two interesting insights. First, we ﬁnd that if productive activity harms a disputed
common stock (a common occurrence), then moderate conﬂi c tm a yw o r kt op r e s e r v et h e
resources and raise social welfare. This positive result holds not only in the steady state, but
also along the system’s dynamic path. Second, our methodology conﬁrms the intuition that
absent exogenous intervention, when Hirshleifer’s paradox of power holds, it is necessarily
a short run phenomenon. Once investment of conﬂict spoils is taken into account, we see
that an initially resource-poor group will eventually obtain an equal level of resources as
the initially resource-rich rival. Thus, our model suggests that long-term consistent resource
disparities may be driven by exogenous factors such as laws established by dominant groups
that deny equal access to investment opportunities or common resources.
As our work represents an initial step in the study of conﬂict dynamics, worthwhile re-
search extensions are numerous. We mention three important areas here. First, while our
assumption of myopic agents is appropriate where property rights regimes are weak or where
rights over the common resource cannot be assigned (e.g., where the resource is potential
voters), conﬂict situations can also arise in setting where property rights can be assigned.
In these situations, agents may face a dynamic optimization problem, and their behavior
23may diﬀer from that studied here.36 Second, many forms of conﬂict harm both disputed
and captive resources. In these settings our ﬁnding that conﬂict is beneﬁcial may fail to
hold. Finally, future work could explore the sensitivity of our results to modiﬁcations con-
sidered by Hirshleifer and others including diﬀerent conﬂict protocols (such as Stackelberg),
distinguishing between defensive and oﬀensive activities and using diﬀerent conﬂict success
functions.
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